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WHY THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT CANNOT 






The United States is a pluralistic society, supporting an 
enormous array of different religions and often multiple independent 
interpretations of those religions. The United States has fallen short 
of its aspirations to show full tolerance for minority religions,1 even 
though it enshrines protections for the vital rights of freedom of 
religion in its Constitution. 2  However, the way these rights of 
freedom of religion have been interpreted and protected by the 
judiciary, particularly under the Free Exercise Clause, has varied 
throughout the years. 
Seminal cases including Sherbert3 and Yoder4 helped establish 
what came to be known as the substantial burden test. The 
substantial burden test determines when a government action was at 
risk of violating the protections of the First Amendment religious 
rights. Although this test was used numerous times, its applicability 
was severely narrowed in Smith.5 This narrowing sparked outrage 
from a variety of religious groups, political groups, and the general 
public. They felt that, as narrowed, it left far too little protection for 
their religious freedoms. This is especially significant since some 
government actions may infringe upon a religious freedom in ways 
that may not be obvious to the institutions that take the action or 
promulgate the law. Thus, Congress responded to the outcry and 
                                                                                                             
∗ Timothy A. Wiseman is a practicing attorney and programmer in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. He would like to thank the American Indian Law Journal for their 
editorial assistance as well as Professor Jay Bybee for providing feedback on an 
early draft. 
1 The U.S. for a time banned the use of peyote in spite of significance to certain 
Native American Religions. See, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
874 (1990); see also infra Part II. Although later rectified by the courts, inmates 
in Ohio have been denied access to items essential for their worship. See, e.g., 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. art. I 
3 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
4 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 








passed the Religious Freedom Restoration (RFRA) act with the 
specific intention of restoring the jurisprudence to the state it was in 
before Smith.6 
While it was valuable in protecting the rights of religious 
minorities, the substantial burden test was not enough to protect 
Native American religions and their sacred places, either before or 
after the RFRA was passed. Many of these sacred places are located 
on land owned by the federal government and actions by federal 
agencies may disturb or even desecrate these important sites.7 Even 
before the Smith decision, the courts frequently failed to protect 
some of these sacred locations from federal agencies, or even to 
subject these actions to the full scrutiny of a compelling interest 
test. 8   In fact, the Supreme Court has been openly critical of 
restrictions placed on what the government can do with federal land 
based on religious needs. 9  Some have claimed that the RFRA 
legislatively expanded the protections beyond the precise test as 
established by Sherbert and Yoder, and that this should now provide 
better protection for the sacred places in America.10 But the Ninth 
Circuit has ruled that the RFRA uses the phrase “substantial burden” 
in a precise way that limits the applicability of the statue.11 As the 
Ninth Circuit has interpreted the phrase in Navajo Nation,12 the 
protections of the RFRA can only be invoked when a government 
action either denies a benefit or delivers a punishment for following 
religious precepts.13 
This paper will explain that the Ninth Circuit established the 
correct definition for “substantial burden” as that phrase is used in 
the RFRA, and so the political branches must act to protect locations 
                                                                                                             
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). 
7 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Toward a Balanced Approach for the Protection of 
Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 270 (2012); Marcia 
Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites, 113 YALE L. J. 1623, 1627 (2004).  
8 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 
439 (1988).   
9 Id. at 453 (explaining that whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the 
area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its rights to use what 
is, after all, its land). 
10 Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
1175, 1213 (1996). 
11 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
12  The Navajo Nation case is also referred to as the “San Francisco Peaks 
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sacred to Native American religions. Despite the eloquent dissent 
and subsequent academic literature criticizing Navajo Nation, it was 
correctly decided. This only shows that other methods must be used 
to ensure that federal agencies show great deference to the needs of 
Native Americans when making decisions about federal land. Part 
II of this paper will look at the history that led to the passage of the 
RFRA, including the cases which established the substantial burden 
test, the Smith case which vastly narrowed the use of that standard, 
and the passage of the RFRA itself which largely nullified Smith. 
Part III will explore some significant applications of the substantial 
burden test to the protection of the Native American religion in 
general and, in particular, their sacred religious sites. It will then 
look at the Navajo Nations case, which dealt with using recycled 
water on sacred land. The implications of that decision, which did 
not protect the Native American interests will be explored. This 
section will also look at how that case has impacted other cases and 
how it has been viewed in academic literature. Part IV will explore 
both the affirmative case for the interpretation of the phrase 
“substantial burden” used by the Ninth Circuit. Part IV will also 
explore and respond to the criticisms which have been raised in the 
dissent and in other papers.  The paper will conclude that Native 
American sacred places need further protection, but that this 
protection must come through additional actions from the political 
branches rather than changes in judicial interpretation. 
 
II. SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS, SMITH, AND THE RFRA 
 
A. Establishing the Substantial Burden Test in Sherbert and Yoder 
 
The Constitution protects the people’s right to religious freedom 
in the First Amendment, which says "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof…".14 Based on this amendment, the Supreme Court 
established what came to be called the "substantial burden test."15 
                                                                                                             
14 U.S. CONST. amend. art. I. 
15 Eloise H. Bouzari, The Substantial Burden Test's Impact on the Free Exercise 
of Minority Religions, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 123, 124 (1996). This test is 








This test arose from the Supreme Court cases of Sherbert v. Verner 
and Wisconsin v. Yoder when read together.16   
In Sherbert, an employer terminated a member of the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church after she refused to work her Church's 
Sabbath of Saturday.17 She filed for unemployment compensation, 
but was denied payment because she refused to accept any 
employment which would require her to break her Sabbath.18 She 
appealed this decision, and eventually came before the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court stated that to be constitutionally 
acceptable, the law must either place no burden upon the right of 
free exercise of religion or that the burden must be justified by a 
compelling and legitimate interest.19 The Court then found that this 
law placed a burden on the plaintiff because following her religion 
would force her give up government benefits.20 It further found that 
there was no sufficiently compelling interest to justify this burden, 
noting that it required more than a mere rational basis to justify such 
an infringement on free exercise.21 
Yoder was decided after Sherbert, and dealt with members of the 
Old Order Amish and Conservative Amish Mennonite Churches 
who refused to send their children to required education beyond the 
eighth grade for religious reasons.22 The Court found that when a 
state action "interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious 
belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free 
exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state 
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause."23 Although the Court 
recognized the state's legitimate interest in seeing that the children 
were educated, it emphasized that "only those interests of the highest 
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate 
                                                                                                             
16 Id. See also Jessica M. Wiles, Note, Have American Indians Been Written Out 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 71 MONT. L. REV. 471, 474-475 
(2010). The exact phrase “substantial burden” does not appear in either Sherbert 
or Yoder. Skibine, supra note 7 at 278. 
17 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963). 
18 Id. at 400-01. 
19 Id. at 403-04.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 406-07. 
22 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-208 (1972). 
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claims to the free exercise of religion."24 The Court found that the 
state's interest in this case could not balance out the rights of free 
expression, combined with the interests of parenthood that they had 
asserted, especially since the court found that the Amish did provide 
continued education even if it was not of the form the state 
preferred.25 
Together, these cases established the substantial burden test.26 
That test requires that the court determine if a government action 
imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. If it 
did, then the court would have to consider a second step and 
determine if the burden was outweighed by a compelling, legitimate 
interest.27 This test was applied a number of times, with some minor 
variations and interpretations until 1990 when the Supreme Court 
considered Employment Division v. Smith.28 
 
B. Changing the Substantial Burden Test with Smith 
 
In Smith, the Court significantly reduced the applicability of the 
substantial burden test, and this decision created intense academic 
discussion of the matter.29 Here, Alfred Smith and Galen Black were 
terminated from their positions with a private company after it was 
learned that they had used peyote, a controlled substance under the 
law, in one of their religious activities.30 The fact that the peyote 
was used as part of an organized religious ritual and that it was 
forbidden by their religious organizations for use outside of such 
                                                                                                             
24 Id. at 215. 
25 Id. at 233-35. 
26 Wiles, supra note 16 at 475. See also Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124. 
27 Some academic commentators such as Jessica Wiles have asserted that there 
was also a requirement that it be done with the least restrictive means. Wiles, 
supra note 15 at 475. However, I was unable to find that language in either 
Sherbert or Yoder. Further, the Ninth Circuit in interpreting the RFRA 
specifically stated that Congress added that language to the RFRA as an addition 
to the original test in the pre-Smith jurisprudence. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 
Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008). 
28 Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124. See e.g. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 
707 (1981). 
29 Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124. 








rituals did not protect them from being terminated.31 They then 
requested unemployment compensation from the state, and they 
were denied since they had been terminated for misconduct which 
violated state law.32 They sought judicial intervention. The Oregon 
Supreme Court, following the reasoning in Sherbert found that 
denying them unemployment benefits under these circumstances 
would be a violation of their free expression rights. The U.S. 
Supreme Court then considered the case, but remanded it to the 
Oregon Supreme Court which again found in favor of Mr. Smith and 
Mr. Black, and the Supreme Court once again granted certiorari.33 
The Supreme Court declared that the substantial burden test, as 
announced in Sherbert, was only applicable in the field of 
unemployment compensation. 34  In particular, they said that the 
Sherbert test was not relevant to a "generally applicable criminal 
law."35 Although this case did deal with an unemployment claim, 
the applicability of the criminal law banning the use of peyote was 
significant since they were denied unemployment benefits because 
they were terminated for violating a criminal law. The Court also 
distinguished this situation from Yoder. The Court noted that here 
the terminated employees claimed only rights under the Free 
Exercise Clause had been violated while in Yoder, and many of the 
other cases where the substantial burden test was employed, another 
right was asserted along with the Free Exercise Clause.36 Those 
other cases involved hybrid rights where Free Exercise was 
buttressed by some other significant right. In Yoder in particular, the 
Amish asserted their rights to direct the education of their children 
along with their religious rights.37 The court emphasized that the 
centrality or significance of the religious belief could not play a role 
in determining what test would be used to determine if the law was 
constitutional.38 It would be neither appropriate nor possible for a 
                                                                                                             
31 Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in 
American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 394 (2012). 
32 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875 (1990). 
33 Id. at 875-76. 
34 Id. at 883.  
35 Id. at 884. 
36 Id. at 881-82. 
37 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-35 (1972). supra note Section II.A. 
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court to decide what was central to a religion and what was more 
peripheral.  
With this backdrop, the court found that the requirement to show 
a compelling interest was rarely applicable in the context of 
religious freedom. It was effectively limited to cases that could 
allege a violation of a hybrid right.39 The majority opinion went so 
far as to call a broad application of this test to religious matters to 
be "courting anarchy."40 The majority provided a parade of horribles 
of matters, in other words, a list of matters that could be challenged 
on a religious basis that the majority felt it would be undesirable to 
leave exposed to such challenges.41 The majority expressed their 
concerns that health and safety regulations, animal cruelty laws, and 
even child labor laws could be challenged in this way.42 It concluded 
by finding that the prohibition of peyote was constitutional; 
therefore, the denial of the unemployment benefits was proper.43 It 
stated that those burdened were not left without recourse though, 
since those who felt their religious freedom was being infringed 
could seek aid from the legislative and executive branches through 
the political process.44 The court directly recognized that this may 
be difficult for minority religions which may have trouble gaining 
attention from the more political branches of government.45 Because 
                                                                                                             
39 Id. at 881. See also Wiles, supra note 16 at 477 (discussing the hybrid claims). 
40 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.  
41 The court does not make clear in its parade of horribles why subjecting these 
matters to a substantial burden scrutiny is actually horrible. Presumably those of 
true significance could pass the examination, and the rest perhaps should either 
not be regulated by law at all or could accommodate religious exemptions. The 
first example, for instance, is compulsory military service, but America does 
allow for conscientious objector status so long as the objector meets certain 
qualifications. As discussed in the next section, Congress appeared to think that 
the test was workable. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89. 
42 Id.; Some academics agreed with the concerns about some of the items in the 
parade of horribles. For instance, some religions permit punishments that would 
be considered domestic violence under secular law, and some academics are 
concerned that without limitations on religious protections like those established 
in Smith their religion could give the abusers effective protections from those 
laws. Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1832, 1833 (2011). 










of this, Native Americans in practice have limited protections for 
their religious rights in some cases. 
 
C. Nullifying Smith with RFRA 
 
The decision in Smith was subject to vigorous academic 
discussion and even in the popular press, much of it critical of the 
ruling and the reasoning used by the majority. 46 Many groups 
reacted with anger and shock, as they saw this as a direct threat to 
the protections of the religious freedom.47 One professor went as far 
as saying that “the Court had held that every American has a right 
to believe in a religion, but no right to practice it.”48 Lower courts 
naturally took their guidance from this ruling, with some academics 
watching these courts saying that they took the ruling to mean that 
free expression arguments could have no sway, and that no facially 
neutral law could be found infirm based solely on a free expression 
challenge.49 Not all academics were inclined to see Smith as either 
incorrect or entirely undesirable as a precedent.50 It could ensure that 
some could not use religion to escape responsibility for their 
improper actions. 51 However, the weight of opinion was firmly 
aligned against the precedent in Smith, and a broad consortium of 
individuals and groups, from a variety of political leanings and a 
variety of religious beliefs, called for Congressional intervention in 
the matter.52 Congress heard them, and answered. 
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA).53 The act had overwhelmingly broad support. It was 
supported by both Republicans and Democrats, with members of 
both parties sponsoring the bill.54 It was swiftly signed into law by 
                                                                                                             
46 Bouzari, supra note 15 at 124-25. 
47 See Wiles, supra note 16 at 478. 
48 Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. 
REV. 221, 221 (1993). 
49 Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 214-15 (1994). 
50 See generally Griffin, supra note 35. 
51 Arguing that it provided protection for some groups, particularly women, from 
those who may cloak their illicit activities with religion. Id. 
52 Laycock & Thomas, supra note 49 at 210-11. 
53 Id. 
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President Clinton.55 The bill had a stated purpose of restoring the 
compelling interest test and directly cited both Sherbert and Yoder.56 
The Committee on the Judiciary, in its report for the House of 
Representatives, said it expected “that the courts will look to the free 
exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance”.57 
The bill, in its findings, specifically named Smith as an impetus for 
the passage of the bill.58 The Senate, in its consideration, specifically 
sought to ensure protection for minority religions, who may not 
always be able to readily gain the attention of the political branches 
of the government.59 
The RFRA created a cause of action to challenge a government 
action that substantially burdened exercise of religion under the test 
established in Sherbert and Yoder.60 It permitted that substantial 
burden to stand only if the government could then show it was 
necessary for a compelling government interest and that it was the 
least restrictive means of achieving that goal. 61  As scholars 
promptly noted, the effectiveness of the RFRA depended on the 
interpretation of the terms "exercise of religion," "substantially 
burden," and "compelling interest."62 The application of the RFRA 
was swiftly challenged in court as it applies to states, and was found 
unconstitutional in that context based on separation of powers.63 
This means that the states are not bound by the already limited 
protections for freedom of religion provided by the RFRA. 
However, it remains in effect as applied to the federal government, 
and it provides additional protection beyond what is available under 
the ruling in Smith.64   
                                                                                                             
55 Id. at 210. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). 
57 H.R. Rep. No. 103-88 at 6-7 (1993). Some scholars have argued that the bill 
went beyond merely restoring the pre-Smith law. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental 
Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175, 1213 (1996); Skibine, 
supra note 7 at 282. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2012).  
59 Sen. Rpt. No. 102-111 at 8 (July 27, 1993). See also Wiles, supra note 16 at 
480.  
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
61 Id. 
62 Laycock & Thomas, supra note 49 at 210-11. 
63 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
64 Gonzalez v. O Central Espirita Beneficenta Unaiao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 









III. NATIVE AMERICANS, NAVAJO NATION, AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
A. Protecting Native Religions before Navajo Nation 
 
The ability to practice their religion freely is vital to every group 
of people with an independent identity. For Native Americans in 
particular, tribal leaders have asserted that the ability to practice 
their traditional religions is essential to their self-determination.65 
Navajo Nation President, Joe Shirley, has even said that restrictions 
on their ability to practice their religion free from outside 
contamination are akin to genocide as well as religious 
persecution.66 Because of the significance of their religion, there 
have been a number of cases of Native Americans and Native 
American groups seeking protection for their religious activities and 
for places of religious significance to them. 
One prominent example in the appellate courts is Sequoyah v. 
TVA, which was decided in 1980. 67  Sequoyah was brought by 
practitioners of the traditional Cherokee religion to prevent the 
Tennessee Valley Authority from building a dam.68 This dam would 
have flooded regions that the Cherokee considered sacred as well as 
areas once used as Cherokee cemeteries. Since it was decided in 
1980, this case came after the substantial burden test is established 
in Sherbert and Yoder but before the effects of Smith and the RFRA. 
The court thus applied the substantial burden test and found that 
there was no substantial burden that needed to be balanced. 69  
Although they acknowledged that graves may be disturbed or that 
significant places may be flooded, the court found that represented 
personal preference rather than strongly held convictions. 70  In 
comparing it with previous cases, the court found that there was 
                                                                                                             
65 Carpenter, supra note 31 at 397. 
66 Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents Now Targeting City Council, ARIZ 
DAILY SUN, (Jan 13, 2006), available at http://azdailysun.com/snowmaking-
opponents-now-targeting-city-council/article_3cff71dc-acbf-59f9-8461-
63548e54cfb5.html. 
67 Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
68 Id. at 1160-61. 
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nothing which was inseparable from their way of life, or that was 
central to their religion that would be destroyed by the flooding.71 
The court also noted, while saying that it was not dispositive by 
itself, that the Cherokee has no legally recognized property interest 
in the land in question. The court thus declined to protect this 
significant place. 
Another prominent example arose in Wilson v. Block in 1983.72 
In Wilson, groups representing both the Hopi and Navajo tribes sued 
to prevent the further development of an area of the Coconino 
National Forest, including the San Francisco Peaks. 73  The San 
Francisco Peaks were of great religious significance to both the 
Hopis and the Navajo.74 The Navajo believed that the Peaks were 
the home to certain spiritual beings and were significant for healing. 
The Hopi also believed that a group of spiritual beings, called 
Kachinas, occasionally dwelt on those peaks.75 The Hopis asserted 
in this case that use of this area for commercial purposes would be 
an insult to the Creator and the Kachinas. Nevertheless, a portion of 
the peaks had been used for recreational skiing since 1937. This suit 
was launched because the forest service authorized the company 
managing the ski facilities to clear additional land and upgrade the 
facilities. The Native Americans asserted a claim under the Free 
Exercise Clause.76 The court highlighted the need for the plaintiff to 
bear the initial burden of proof in a free exercise challenge to show 
that the there was a burden upon religion.77 Citing to Sherbert, the 
court noted that this burden may be indirect.78 But, while the burden 
may be indirect, it must still come in the form of penalizing faith in 
                                                                                                             
71 Id. 
72 Wilson v. Block, 708 F. 2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
73 Id. at 738-39. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. Marcia Glowacka, et al., Navutakya’ovi, San Francisco Peaks, 50 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 547, 553-54 (2009) (using the transliteration 
“Katsinam”). 
76 They also asserted claims under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 
the Endangered Species Act, and several other statutes. These other claims are 
not relevant to this paper. The trial court found for the defendants on all but one 
claim under the National Historic Preservation Act. The defendants brought 
themselves into compliance with that act. Wilson v. Block, 708 F. 2d 735, 739 
(D.C. Cir. 1983).   









some way. Government actions that merely offend believers or even 
cast doubt upon the veracity of the belief, without in some way 
penalizing that faith, will not place a burden upon the faith as that 
term is used in Sherbert.79 Thus, the court held that the tribes would 
need to show that, at a minimum, the government’s plan would have 
impaired some religious function that could not be performed 
elsewhere for the land use to place a substantial burden on their 
religion.80   
The tribes argued that they could meet that standard. The court 
agreed that their affidavits showed that the use of the Peaks were 
vital to their religions, both for ceremonies and for the gathering of 
items which were significant to their ceremonies.81 However, the 
Forest Service had allowed the tribes free access to the Peaks for 
religious purposes and planned to continue doing so. They could not 
demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction any activity that they would 
be unable to continue to perform after the expansion and 
modernization.82 The court, much like the court in Sequoyah, thus 
declined to protect the Native American Religions under the Free 
Exercise Clause. Much like Sequoyah, this case was decided before 
Smith and overtly and conscientiously applied the standard set forth 
in Sherbert.  
 
B. The Navajo Nation Decision 
 
Navajo Nation proved to be both a significant and highly 
controversial decision from the Ninth Circuit, dealing with the 
RFRA and the rights of Native Americans in particular. Much like 
Wilson, the significant Navajo Nation decision revolves around the 
San Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest.83 In 2002, the 
operators of the ski facilities on the Peaks asked for permission to 
use recycled wastewater to create artificial snow. 84  This would 
                                                                                                             
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 744-45.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 745. 
83 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that the ski facilities had been previously challenged in Wilson). 
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allow them to expand the season during which skiers could visit and 
make use of the facility and improve the quality of the snow. 
However, recycled wastewater can contain human waste even after 
it has been processed. 85  In 2005, after investigations and 
consultations with Native American groups, the Forest Service 
approved the request by the operators to use recycled waste water.86 
Native American groups found this to be an affront to their 
spirituality and began taking steps to prevent the use of the 
wastewater. They began with an appeal to an administrative board, 
and then sued in the district court.87 Both the administrative appeal 
board and the district court found that the use of the wastewater was 
permissible. So, the Native American groups appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit. A three judge panel initially found that this plan violated the 
RFRA, but the Ninth Circuit then took the case en banc.88 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the case in light 
of the RFRA.89 The court stated that, similar to the Sherbert test 
examined in Wilson,90 the initial burden of proof was on the Native 
Americans to establish that this government action placed a 
substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 91  Only if they 
crossed this hurdle would the burden shift to the government to 
show that its action supported a compelling government interest and 
that it did so in the least restrictive way. Both sides agreed that the 
Native Americans held sincere religious beliefs and were engaged 
in the exercise of religion on the Peaks.92 The Court focused on the 
meaning of the phrase "substantial burden" in the context of the 
RFRA. 
The Religious Freedom Restoration act was explicitly intended 
to restore the test established in Sherbert and Yoder, so the court 
                                                                                                             
85 Id. at 1063. 
86 Id. at 1066-67. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1067 
89 Other matters were also before the court including the National Environmental 
Policy Act and the national Historic Preservation Act. The Ninth Circuit found 
in favor of the Forest Service on those issues as well, but those details are not 
relevant here. Id. at 1063. 
90 See supra Section III.A.  









examined the meaning of the phrase in those cases.93 The Ninth 
Circuit held that a "substantial burden" exists "only when 
individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of 
their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or 
coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil 
or criminal sanctions (Yoder)."94 They then went even further to say 
that even if a government action could "virtually destroy" the ability 
of a group to practice their religion it could not constitute a 
"substantial burden" under the RFRA unless it did so through a 
conditional benefit or coercion that compelled them to act contrary 
to their faith.95 As a matter of policy, the Court was concerned that 
a broader reading of the meaning of those words could cause almost 
any governmental action to be "subject to the personalized oversight 
of millions of citizens" with a vast diversity of religious beliefs and 
sensibilities.96 
The court found that there was no substantial burden, within the 
meaning of the RFRA, placed upon the Native American's 
religion. 97  While acknowledging that there may be a serious 
diminishment of the spiritual fulfillment of Native Americans who 
practice their religion on this peak and that it was offensive to their 
religious sensibilities, the use of the wastewater neither denied them 
a benefit nor attempted to coerce action from them.98 It thus, under 
this definition, did not place a cognizable substantial burden upon 
them and there was no need to evaluate if there was a compelling 
government interest or whether the least restrictive means to achieve 
it were being used. Attempts by the Native American groups to 
appeal to the Supreme Court were rejected.99 
 
C. Criticisms of the Navajo Nation Decision 
 
                                                                                                             
93 Id. at 1069-70. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)  
94 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070. 
95 Id. at 1072. 
96 Id. at 1063-64. 
97 Id. at 1078. 
98 Id. at 1063. 
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Since the release of the Navajo Nation opinion, there has been 
extensive scholarship on its meaning and its impact. Much of that 
scholarship agreed with the dissent and criticizing the majority 
decision. 100  Ms. Wiles, for instance, has argued that the Ninth 
Circuit has unduly narrowed the interpretation of the phrase 
"substantial burden," and has turned the RFRA from a restriction on 
effect to one that merely restricts the form of government action.101 
She argues that giving the phrase its plain meaning would not create 
the individual veto that the Ninth Circuit was concerned about but 
would rather allow a more flexible protection for religious beliefs.102 
She highlights studies which have shown that government actions 
satisfy the compelling interest test 72% of the time when it is fully 
applied in the context of religious activity.103 She also highlights 
actions which she believe Congress specifically intended to prohibit 
with the RFRA that she believes would not satisfy the Ninth 
Circuit's interpretation.104 Specifically, she believes that autopsies 
would not qualify as a substantial burden as the Ninth Circuit has 
phrased the test despite being banned by certain faiths.105 
Professor Carpenter also expressed concerns with the results of 
the case.106 She asserts that the RFRA as interpreted by the Ninth 
Circuit will provide no protection for Native American sacred sites 
or their religious freedom at those sites.107 In fact, she believes that 
under that interpretation, the courts will be unable to provide their 
vital role of protecting minority rights from the political process 
which is driven by the majority.108 She asserts that this ruling will 
leave the protection of tribal religions and their sacred sites at the 
mercy of agency discretion.109 
                                                                                                             
100 See, e.g., Bouzari, supra note 15; Wiles, supra note 16. 
101 At the time of her writing, Ms. Wiles was a student commentator with the 
Lewis and Clark Law School. Wiles, supra note 16 at 494-95. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 497. 
105 Id. 
106 At the time her paper was published, Professor Carpenter was the Associate 
Professor of Law, and Director of the American Indian Law Program at 
University of Colorado Law School. Carpenter, supra note 31 at 459. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 480. 








Ms. Erickson looks at Navajo Nation though a biopolitical lens 
provided by Foucault.110 Biopolitics is the ability of a government 
to control its citizens as populations, and "the power to make live 
and let die."111 She highlights the strong link to the land itself in 
Native American religions to show that there is no way to impact 
the land they identify as sacred without affecting the populations and 
their religion.112 In Native American religions, unlike most sects of 
Judeo-Christian tradition, particular places may be of great 
significance to a religious experience and to religious belief. 113 
Maintaining their religion, continuing religious ceremonies, and 
perpetuating their religious history are vital for their survival as 
tribes. They also all require ties to particular places and respect both 
for land in general and for particular pieces of land which hold 
religious significance for them. In this light, actions such as using 
reclaimed wastewater on sacred land could be viewed as an 
existential threat to the affected Native American tribes by 
damaging their ability to practice their religions and traditions in a 
way that the Native Americans will view as valid and pure.114 She 
argues that under the standard established by the Ninth Circuit it 
would be unlikely that any Native American religious concerns 
about how land sacred to them, but owned by the federal 
government, would receive any protection. 115  Because of the 
seriousness of the damage to the Native Americans both in this case 
itself and in cases that come after it, Ms. Erickson urges a 
reconsideration of the standard for "substantial burden" that the 
Ninth Circuit has adopted. 
 
D. The Aftermath of the Navajo Nation Decision 
                                                                                                             
110 Ms. Erickson was, at the time of her paper, a student commentator with 
Seattle University School of Law. She holds a B.A. in Philosophy and Religious 
Studies. Jessica M. Erickson, Making Live and Letting Die: The Biopolitical 
Effect of Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 33 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 463 
(2010). 
111 Id. at 463. 
112 Id. at 465. 
113 Id. at 472-73. 
114 Id. at 487; Glowacka, supra note 75 at 554. 
115 As discussed more in Section IV.B., she may well be right. This standard 
would be hard to meet when it came to any proposed land use. Erickson, supra 
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The concerns that some critics have raised that the effects of the 
Ninth Circuit's ruling might have on other cases affecting Native 
American religions are not academic. The case has been cited 
numerous times. The effects of the case were felt almost 
immediately since the pending Snoqualmie Indian Tribe case had 
been held in abeyance while waiting for the en banc rehearing of 
Navajo Nation. 116  In that case, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) had authorized the continuation of a 
hydroelectric project that affected the Snoqualmie River and the 
Snoqualmie Falls into which the river flowed. The hydroelectric 
project affected the tribe's access to the falls, which they used for 
religious experiences.117 It eliminated a mist that frequently formed 
at the base of falls which was significant for their religious 
practices. 118 This project altered the land itself, which the tribe 
considered to be sacred. The Ninth Circuit applied the standard it 
announced in Navajo Nation to determine that there was no 
substantial burden placed upon the tribal religion.119 Although this 
project impacted the tribes, it did not place them in a situation where 
exercise of their religion would either deprive them of government 
benefits or subject them to sanctions. The Ninth Circuit thus again 
declined to protect sites sacred to a Native American Tribe.120 This 
immediate aftermath of the Navajo Nation case showed the 
importance of that decision, and how the courts cannot, under the 
current laws, provide proper protection for sacred religious spaces.  
 
IV. THE CASE FOR A NARROW READING OF “SUBSTANTIAL 
BURDEN” 
 
A. The Affirmative Case for a Narrow Reading of Substantial 
Burden 
 
                                                                                                             
116 Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2008). 
117 Id. at 1213. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1214-15. 
120 The tribe also asserted other rights including the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA), but those claims were also denied by the appellate 








The majority's decision in Navajo Nation and in particular its 
narrow interpretation of "substantial burden" was subjected to a 
vigorous and eloquent dissent as well as well reasoned academic 
criticism. Nontheless, the majority’s decision used the correct 
interpretation of those words under both standards of statutory 
interpretation and of policy. As the majority points out, a narrow 
reading focusing on either a denial of benefits or punishment for 
following a religious dictate is the natural interpretation of the 
statute.121 The RFRA used the term "substantial burden" without 
providing a definition. When a statute uses a term of art which is 
already well in use within the field the statute is referring to, it is 
both natural and supported by precedent to assume, absent contrary 
evidence, to give that term the meaning it has held as a term of art 
rather than referring to a more conventional dictionary definition.122 
Moreover, in this particular case, the statute expressly refers to two 
cases that helped originally define that term of art. This shows that 
it is correct to give this term of art its meaning in case law and to 
give particular attention to those two cases when evaluating the 
term. 
In those cases, as the majority correctly points out, a substantial 
burden was found when a government benefit was conditioned on 
violating a religious precept or when sanctions were threatened 
unless a religious precept was violated.123 Cases that came after 
Sherbert and Yoder in the Supreme Court, but before the RFRA, do 
not provide evidence that the Supreme Court intended for a broader 
meaning. The majority opinion expressly declares that there are no 
cases in which the Supreme Court has found a substantial burden on 
free exercise when it did not fall into one of those two categories.124 
In fact, other pre-Smith decisions would seem to emphasize the 
narrowness of the use of this term. Lyng, which the majority opinion 
discusses at length, is worthy of particular attention.125 
                                                                                                             
121 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1068-71 (9th Cir. 
2008), cert denied 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
122 Id. at 1074. 
123 Id. at 1069-70. 
124 Id. at 1075. 
125 Id. at 1072.; Ms. Erickson asserts that Lyng limited the applicability of the 
RFRA. This may be correct in a sense, but the Supreme Court decided Lyng in 
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In Lyng, Native American groups challenged a Forest Service 
decision to build a road through the Chimney Rock area of the Six 
Rivers National Forest as well as harvest of timber from that area.126 
This road would help link two California towns.127 It would also 
disrupt the environmental conditions that are necessary for the 
practice of certain rituals and religious practices of the Native 
Americans.128 The Supreme Court noted specifically that the Native 
Americans were not being coerced into acting against their beliefs 
nor would they be denied a benefit for acting according to their 
beliefs. 129  Although the court never directly uses a phrase like 
"substantial burden test," it does cite to Sherbert and Yoder and it 
declines to find a heavy enough burden upon free exercise to force 
the government to show a compelling interest in the road.130 This 
pre-Smith case decided by the Supreme Court supports, at least 
indirectly, the interpretation given by the Ninth Circuit to the phrase 
"substantial burden."131 
The Ninth Circuit is also correct as a matter of policy. It asserted 
that a broader reading would permit every person to "hold and 
individual veto to prohibit the government action solely because it 
offends his religious beliefs, sensibilities, or tastes, or fails to satisfy 
his religious desires." 132  As some critics have pointed out, the 
majority may go too far in its language. A broad reading of 
substantial burden would not grant the ability to outright forbid such 
government actions, but it could make it much easier to force the 
                                                                                                             
which was decided in 1990. This makes it a pre-Smith case which interpreted the 
pre-Smith standard rather than an explicit limit or interpretation of the RFRA. 
Erickson, supra note 110 at 477. 
126 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442-443 
(1988). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 448-49. 
129 Id.at 449. 
130 Id. at 447 
131 In Navajo Nation, the plaintiffs tried to distance this situation from Lyng by 
saying the Lyng did not apply the Sherbert test. Because there is some merit to 
that, the support provided by Lyng is best characterized as indirect. However, 
the majority disagreed with the plaintiffs on the applicability of Lyng. Even 
granting the plaintiff's assertions that Lyng should not be controlling, it is 
certainly consistent with the decision reached by the majority. Navajo Nation v. 
U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2008). 








government to demonstrate a compelling interest before taking 
action. There are numerous religions, often with numerous sects and 
subdivisions which have different beliefs; it could be quite easy to 
offend the religious sensibilities of some sect with a government 
action. Outside of coercion of some form, the legislature is better 
equipped to evaluate the affects governmental actions on various 
religions in this diverse society and to balance their needs than the 
courts could be.133 
 
B. Responding to the Critics 
 
Those who disagree with the majority have an array of 
meritorious arguments for a broader reading. Perhaps the most 
compelling is highlighting the great weight of spiritual disquiet this 
particular decision and those that follow its example bring. Members 
of the Navajo Nation have publicly compared the use of the 
reclaimed wastewater, which may have some remnants of human 
waste, on land they hold sacred to genocide.134 Ms. Erickson came 
close to that by saying it was a challenge to their ability to survive 
as a unified tribe over time. 135  The dissent in Navajo Nation 
eloquently lays out some details of the various religions of the 
several Native American groups involved in the suit and shows the 
significance of the Snowbowl area to them.136 While the Native 
Americans considered many areas sacred, the San Francisco Peaks 
are more sacred than most others, and one of the Native American 
leaders compared it to the Tabernacle.137  The dissent highlighted 
the statements of Navajo medicine men that the use of reclaimed 
water, which may have come from mortuaries and hospitals, would 
destroy his ability to practice as a medicine man and prevent him 
from performing the Belssingway ceremony. 138  Similarly, the 
Hualapi could be prevented from using the waters from the peaks in 
                                                                                                             
133 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 
(1988). 
134 Cole, supra note 66.  
135 See supra Section III C.  
136 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1099-1103 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
137 Id.at 1099. 
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healing ceremonies in ways they would recognize as effective after 
it was contaminated with wastewater. 139  Anthropologists 
researching the matter have stated that use of the reclaimed water, 
and thus polluting the sacred space, may “threaten the very core of 
Hopi spiritual practice.”140 
These arguments are compelling: they show the true seriousness 
of the government's actions on these sacred lands. They are 
persuasive arguments that the treated sewage at issue in Navajo 
Nation should not be used on land sacred to the Native Americans 
and that the Forest Service reached the wrong conclusion in deciding 
to permit it. However, even if the Forest Service was wrong, that 
does not mean that the courts are the proper venue to prevent these 
actions from occurring. As the Supreme Court in Lyng stated, such 
decisions, when they do not cross the line of coercion, are more 
suited to the political branches of the government.141   
There are problems with entrusting such matters entirely to the 
political branches. The courts have often been relied on to protect 
minorities from majoritarian politics.142 Yet, the political process 
often does protect minority religions. Although it required lobbying, 
federal regulations now protect the religious use of peyote in spite 
of rulings in federal court that such protection was not mandated by 
the First Amendment.143 In the past, the executive branch has also 
taken steps to help ensure protection of Native American interests, 
and it can and should continue to do so whenever reasonable.144 
While expecting Congress to intervene swiftly or on a regular basis 
is likely to be problematic, Congress could be petitioned to 
strengthen the provisions of laws that require consultation with and 
consideration of Native American needs such as the American 
                                                                                                             
139 Id. 
140 Glowacka, supra note 75 at 554. 
141 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 
(1988). Additionally, while arguing strenuously that the judiciary should 
reconsider the decision in Navajo Nation, Ms. Wiles also advocated for both the 
legislative and executive branches to intervene and seems to think they can do 
so effectively. Wiles, supra note 16 at 500. 
142 Carpenter, supra note 31 at 480. 
143 Id. at 399-400. 









Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).145 Since the AIRFA was 
insufficient to obtain results favorable to the Native American 
religious followers in Lyng and did prevent the issues that arose in 
Navajo Nation, it is clearly inadequate to provide protections that 
would satisfy the current criticisms. But similar laws have already 
helped reach accommodations between the government and Native 
American groups on several issues, and it could readily be 
strengthened to provide more favorable treatment for Native 
American religious concerns.146 The law as it stands is inadequate 
to provide the needed protections to Native American religious 
groups, but the political branches have taken some steps in that 
direction and they should further improve the way they handle 
religious sensibilities. 
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that courts should provide 
greater review for the actions of federal agencies and their land use, 
the RFRA is not the proper statute to bring such redress. The RFRA 
was explicitly intended to restore the pre-Smith jurisprudence. But 
Lyng was a pre-Smith case,147 and so was Wilson.148 In both of those 
cases, the courts declined to protect the Native American interest 
against the government's actions on federally owned land. If a 
currently existing statute is to be interpreted more broadly to provide 
better protection for sacred sites, then there are other candidates 
such as the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).149 
The court in Lyng read the AIRFA narrowly, but future courts could 
be read it more broadly to provide greater protections for established 
Native American groups without distorting the interpretation of the 
RFRA.150 Using a law like the AIRFA, which is specifically limited 
to protecting established Native American religions, would also 
avoid the concerns of subjecting every government action to 
religious scrutiny by every possible religious interpretation. Using 
the AIRFA more broadly would have a narrower impact than would 
using the RFRA more broadly. Although the arguments that the 
                                                                                                             
145 42 U.S.C. § 1996 et seq. See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988).  
146 Carpenter, supra note 31 at 400. 
147 See supra Section IV.A. 
148 See supra Section III.A. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 1996 et seq. (2012). 
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forest service made the wrong decision are compelling, there are 
better ways of redressing it than the courts. There are more 
appropriate statutes, which are designed specifically to provide 
protections to Native Americans, to do it than the RFRA if it must 
be redressed by the courts. 
The critics, including the dissent, used a number of hypothetical 
examples to attempt to show that the meaning of substantial burden 
should encompass the use of reclaimed water on sacred land. The 
dissent, with later agreement from a number of commentators, 
subtly accuses the majority of being ethnocentric and tries to use 
these hypotheticals to show something that would be comparable in 
the Judeo-Christian framework.151 For instance, the dissent asserted 
that the majority would likely find a substantial burden if there was 
a law that required the use of treated wastewater for baptisms. The 
courts would likely strike down such a law, but with an equal 
protection argument since it would target Christians on its face. 
However, a law or government action of general applicability that 
came close to that in effect most likely would be acceptable under 
the RFRA. For instance, several cities now add treated sewage 
directly back to their general water source.152 Clearly, this is not the 
same as requiring the use of reclaimed wastewater for baptisms, but 
it does mean that any member of the clergy wishing to avoid that 
would have to take extra steps and added expense to avoid doing so 
in those cities. Should a city decide to take the matter further and 
reserve bottled water in the city only for use in hospitals, making it 
yet more difficult to do baptisms without using treated wastewater, 
courts would likely uphold it as an act of general applicability which 
merely burdened religious feelings. 
                                                                                                             
151 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting). Some of the commentators were not so subtle in 
accusing the majority of being ethnocentric. Bouzari, supra note 15 at 135. 
152 See e.g. Mike Lee, Parched Texas Town Turns to Treated Sewage as 
Emergency Drinking Water Source, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (July 11, 2014) 
available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/parched-texas-town-
turns-to-treated-sewage-as-emergency-drinking-water-source/; San Diego 
Agrees to Turns Recycled Wastewater into Drinking Water, FOXNEWS, Nov. 19, 









The dissent also asserted that “a court would surely hold that the 
government had imposed a ‘substantial burden’ on the exercise of 
religion if it purchased by eminent domain every Catholic Church 
in the country.”  Such a sweeping action targeted at a single religious 
institution would be struck down on equal protection. But a less 
extreme version of that has previously survived judicial scrutiny. 
The Pillar of Fire, a religious organization, sued to prevent the 
condemnation of one of their church buildings under imminent 
domain.153 They claimed that the church had a “unique religious 
significance”, although the court was skeptical of that claim.154 They 
made occasional use of this church for active religious worship 
along with other church business and the building held historical 
value to the Pillar of Fire since it served as their headquarters for a 
time.155 The condemnation was part of an urban renewal project that 
contemplated the complete redevelopment of the church’s region, 
and was done as a generally applicable action which did not 
specifically target a religious activity.156 Since this was a matter 
before the state court and the decision was rendered in 1976, they 
did not specifically consider the substantial burden test as it was later 
developed. Nonetheless, the court found that “the contemplated 
condemnation of the property would not interfere with the free 
exercise and enjoyment of religious worship by the Pillar of Fire 
Church.”157 It was found Constitutional, and the reasoning would 
have remained applicable under the substantial burden test had it 
been developed at that time. The situation in Navajo Nation cannot 
even be meaningfully distinguished by asserting that the Snowbowl 
is a unique location. While the court in Pillar of Fire specifically 
rejected the church’s claim that the location was “sui generis”, it 
went on to say that even if it assumed that the property were sui 
generis, that would not have changed the ruling.158 
                                                                                                             
153 Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d 23 (Colo. Sup. 
Ct. 1976). 
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In addition to those hypotheticals, the dissent in Navajo Nation 
brings up two prior cases that it asserts show that the situation in 
Navajo Nation should fall within the meaning of substantial burden. 
In Shakur, a Muslim prisoner was denied kosher meals and the 
regular meals were forbidden by his religion.159 He was offered 
vegetarian meals, which were acceptable to his religion, but 
allegedly caused health issues due to medical conditions.160 The 
court stated that this could constitute a substantial burden and 
remanded for additional factual findings. 161  But in Shakur, the 
government brought enormous pressure upon him to change his 
behavior, distinguishing it from the matter in Navajo Nation. The 
government essentially offered the inmate the choice of eating food 
which violated his religion or forgoing the benefit of proper meals 
provided by the prison.162 The vegetarian option, if his assertions 
were true, was no option because it created medical issues for him. 
Indeed, the court in Shakur notes that it had previously denied a 
similarly situated Muslim inmate’s request for kosher meals because 
that inmate had no medical condition that would be exacerbated by 
the vegetarian meal.163 The inmate thus, while partially because of 
his medical condition, was being punished for following his 
religion, which is absent in the Navajo Nations case. 
Mockaitis, the other case mentioned by the dissent, is similar in 
that the inmates were being presented with a coercive choice.164 
There, a district attorney had recorded the confession of an inmate 
to a priest. 165  The Ninth Circuit found that this constituted a 
substantial burden on the religious practice of the Catholic priests.166 
However, in that case the Ninth Circuit did not attempt to precisely 
define the term substantial burden nor did it perform the type of 
analysis that would have shown what definition they were applying 
to reach that conclusion.167 Despite the dissent’s assertions that the 
                                                                                                             




163 Id. (citing Sefeldeen Alameida, No. 238 Fed. Appx. 204 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
164 Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997). 
165 Id. at 1524-26. 
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167 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1074 n. 15 (9th Cir. 








Mockaitis decision conflicts with the majority opinion, this situation 
most likely would be a substantial burden under the definition 
provided by the majority. Once inmates and prisoners knew that the 
prosecution could record confessions, a suspect would be placed in 
the forbidden choice of abandoning a significant sacrament or else 
suffering the punishment of being forced to deliver evidence to the 
prosecution. That would be a powerful coercive force. In Navajo 
Nation, the Native Americans face no such coercive choice. The 
Native Americans may no longer find value in the rites performed 
on the mountain after it has been tainted by the recycled water, but 
they are not punished for performing the ceremony. The inmate in 
Mockaitis is punished directly for performing his sacrament by 
handing information to the prosecution.  
While the use of the wastewater may be repugnant to the Native 
Americans, none of the examples provided by the dissent and 
embraced by academic critics demonstrates why it should be 
considered a substantial burden under the RFRA. Courts would 
likely not find the hypotheticals to be a substantial burden if reduced 
to any form that would be a generally applicable law. While the 
examples from prior cases they employ clearly were declared a 
substantial burden, those cases are readily distinguished from the 
situation in Navajo Nation and most likely would be found to be 
substantial burdens. This of course does not imply that the Forest 
Service made the right decision, but it does help show that the Ninth 




The law has on multiple occasions failed to protect locations that 
are sacred Native Americans. This has a direct and unfortunate 
impact on their religious experiences and their perception of their 
spirituality. There is a strong and compelling moral argument that 
this situation should be changed to provide Native Americans with 
greater protections and to ensure that their sacred locations are 
treated with proper respect, counterbalanced only with truly vital 
governmental interests.  
While the interests of Native American religious groups should 
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Nation shows that the RFRA is not the proper tool with which to do 
that. It is not the proper tool based upon statutory analysis since that 
indicates the narrow reading that the majority does employ, and that 
is consistent with other Supreme Court cases. The statute, on its 
face, was meant to restore a specific body of case law, but that case 
law had generally failed to provide proper protections for Native 
American sacred sites even before it was overturned. The RFRA is 
not the proper tool based on policy, for reading the phrase 
“substantial burden” broadly enough to bring the Native American 
land issues under the ambit of the RFRA would subject government 
actions to enormous scrutiny from a wide array of actors.  Rather, 
the political branches should act and direct governmental agencies 
to show yet more deference to Native American needs, and 
particularly to their sacred sites in their administrative decision 
making process.  
